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Evaluating policy approaches for tackling informal entrepreneurship
Abstract 
Purpose
When tackling the informal economy, an emergent literature has called for the conventional 
rational economic actor approach (which uses deterrents to ensure that the costs of undeclared 
work outweigh the benefits) to be replaced or complemented by a social actor approach which 
focuses upon improving tax morale. The purpose of this paper is to explore the effectiveness of 
these two policy approaches in reducing informal sector entrepreneurship. 
Design/methodology/approach
To evaluate this, data are reported from a 2015 representative survey involving 1,384 face-to-
face interviews with owners or managers of small businesses in three South-Eastern European 
countries namely, Croatia, Bulgaria and FYR Macedonia.
Findings
The findings provide support for the social actor approach and display that small businesses 
have a greater propensity to perceive competitors as operating informally when the level of tax 
morale is lower. Meanwhile, no support for the deterrence measures of the rational economic 
actor model is reported.
Research limitations/implications
The major limitation of the study is that the paper is not able to display the reasons for the low 
level of tax morale and horizontal trust. Therefore, further in-depth qualitative research is 
necessary to explain whether and how the low levels of trust are determined by the failures of 
various formal institutions.
Originality/value 
This is the first known study on small businesses which analyses simultaneously two distinct 
policy approaches towards reducing participation in informal entrepreneurship.
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Introduction
Over the past decades, it has been widely documented that the informal economy is a persistent 
phenomenon which affects both developing and developed countries. The average size of the 
informal economy across 158 countries has been estimated as equivalent to 31.8 per cent of the 
official GDP over the past two decades, decreasing from 34.5 per cent in 1991 to 27.8 per cent in 
2015 (Medina and Schneider, 2018). Similarly, it has been estimated that two thirds of 
businesses start-up unregistered (Autio and Fu, 2015) and that globally, about a half of 
businesses are unregistered (Acs et al., 2013). However, these figures do not include formal 
businesses that employ informal practices such as under-reporting their turnover/profit, or 
employ unregistered employees, which would result in an even larger proportion of 
entrepreneurship being in the informal economy (Williams, 2018).  
Informal entrepreneurship results in a loss of revenue for governments (Sauka et al., 
2016; Williams, 2018), unfair competition for the legitimate businesses adhering to the formal 
rules (Ali and Najman, 2018; Karlinger, 2013) and an inability of customers to legally solve any 
potential issue related with the low quality of the product or the service purchased informally 
(Williams, 2018). Due to the dominant negative depiction of informal entrepreneurship, and the 
informal sector in general, tackling this phenomenon has become a core concern for governments 
and supra-national agencies (European Commission, 2016; ILO, 2015; OECD, 2012). However, 
how can informal entrepreneurship be tackled? No previous cross-country surveys have 
investigated the type of policy measures entrepreneurs of small businesses find more effective 
for reducing informal practices. This is despite the fact that the studies investigating informal 
entrepreneurship have concluded that small businesses engage in informal work to a greater 
extent than large businesses (La Porta and Shleifer, 2014; Williams, 2018).
Reviewing the literature on policy approaches towards the informal sector in general, two 
distinct approaches can be identified. On one hand, there is a dominant rational economic actor 
approach that tackles the informal economy by ensuring that the benefits of engaging in informal 
work are lower than the costs of such activity. On the other hand, there is a social actor 
approach grounded in a view that participation in informal work is related to tax morale and 
voluntary compliance. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to evaluate the effectiveness of these 
two competing approaches for reducing informal entrepreneurship. Previous studies on informal 
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entrepreneurship have focused only on unregistered businesses and the prevalence of such 
enterprises (Chepurenko, 2016; London et al., 2014; Williams et al., 2016) or on whether 
entrepreneurs report competing against unregistered or informal enterprises (Ali and Najman, 
2018; Williams and Horodnic I.A., 2017a; Williams and Kedir, 2018). However, these studies do 
not take into account that formal businesses employ informal practices. Therefore, to fully 
measure informal entrepreneurship, this paper will analyse how entrepreneurs are affected by the 
informal work conducted by other businesses, regardless of whether these businesses are 
registered or not. 
To commence, Section 2 therefore provides a brief review of the competing policy 
approaches used by governments for tackling the informal sector in general and this will result in 
a set of hypotheses to be tested in relation to informal entrepreneurship more particularly. 
Section 3 describes the data and methodology, namely a logit regression analysis of a 
representative survey conducted in Croatia, Bulgaria and FYR Macedonia, followed in section 4 
by the results and in the final section, the theoretical and policy implications are discussed 
alongside the limitations of the study. 
In doing so, this paper advances understanding of the effectiveness of tackling informal 
entrepreneurship in two ways. From a theoretical perspective, this paper evaluates for the first 
time the competing policy measures used by governments for reducing the informal economy by 
analysing their relevance to the small business sector. From a policy perspective, the paper 
displays the need for changing the focus from deterrents, which are currently considered the 
most effective approach by governments, to measures which foster the vertical and horizontal 
trust of entrepreneurs.    
Small business and the policy measures for reducing informal economy
Although several studies have documented the prevalence of informal entrepreneurship 
(Chepurenko, 2016; London et al., 2014; Williams et al., 2016), there are only a few attempts to 
explore the effectiveness of policy approaches used by governments to tackle informal work. 
Reviewing the literature on the informal sector in general, two types of approach are apparent, 
namely the rational economic actor approach and the social actor approach. We will here 
discuss each in turn.
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The rational economic actor approach has its roots in the seminal work of Allingham 
and Sadmo (1972) that views participants in informal work as rational actors who decide to 
participate in informal work when the benefits of doing so are greater than the costs. This view 
has been widely adopted by governments. For example, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) conclude that Combating informal employment requires a 
comprehensive approach to reduce the costs and increase the benefits to businesses and workers 
of operating formally and ensure that regulations are adequately enforced (OECD, 2008: 32). 
Thus, governments have sought make the informal sector less attractive by increasing the actual 
and/or perceived costs of engaging in informal work (Horodnic and Williams, 2018; Williams 
and Franic, 2016). This has been pursued by increasing firstly the actual and/or the perceived 
risk of detection and secondly, the actual and/or perceived level of sanctions for engaging in 
informal work. Indeed, as a survey with senior government officials conducted in 2017 at the 
European Union level reveals, these stakeholders continue to see the rational economic actor 
approach as the most effective approach, viewing penalties and the improvement of detection as 
the most effective measures for tackling informal work (Williams and Puts, 2017). However, 
when analysing the perception of citizens, the findings are not conclusive. Analysing previous 
citizen surveys, the finding is that while some confirm the effectiveness of this approach, 
revealing that increasing the actual and/or perceived level of deterrents reduces non-compliance 
(Feld and Frey, 2002; Masud et al., 2015; Mazzolini et al., 2017), others found no effect (Hartl 
et al., 2015; Shaw et al., 2008; Williams and Franic, 2015, 2016), and yet others that increasing 
the actual and/or perceived level of deterrents might lead to greater non-compliance due to a 
breakdown of the social contract between the government and its citizens (Chang and Lai, 2004; 
Hofmann et al., 2017; Kaplanoglou and Rapanos, 2015; Murphy, 2005, 2008; Murphy and 
Harris, 2007).
Turning to the few studies conducted with businesses, the results ar  again inconclusive. 
While in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the finding is that the higher the risk of detection and the 
penalty, the lower the tax evasion and misreporting <GH and Sauka, 2017), in Moldova and 
Romania no relationship between the two deterrents and the probability of a business 
deliberately misreporting has been identified <GH et al., 2018). In Greece, investigating a 
sample of small and medium-size enterprises, the finding is that the coercive power of authorities 
has a negative effect on both intended tax compliance and voluntary tax compliance, and yet a 
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positive effect on enforced tax compliance (Kaplanoglou et al., 2016). In Pakistan meanwhile, 
the finding is that the degree of formalization of a business increases with an increase in the risk 
of detection (Williams and Shahid, 2016). However, in the case of informal practices employed 
by businesses, it is not only that previous studies are inconclusive but also, an additional issue is 
the difficulty of enforcement bodies to identify such practices. While a business which is not 
registered or a registered business using unregistered workers might be easier to detect, the 
under-reporting of wages or hidden clauses attached to the contracts of formal employees, as 
well as under-reporting turnover or profit, are harder to identify and prove for enforcement 
bodies. Despite this, this rational economic actor approach remains dominant. Thus, the 
following hypothesis will be tested: 
Rational actor hypothesis (H1): Small businesses will be less affected by the informal 
practices of other businesse  when there is an increase in the perceived risk of detection 
and/or sanctions.
H1a: Small businesses will be less affected by the informal practices of other 
businesses when there is an increase in the perceived risk of detection.
H1b: Small businesses will be less affected by the informal practices of other 
businesses when there is an increase in the perceived sanctions.
In the past few years, an alternative social actor policy approach has emerged which focuses on 
engendering voluntary compliance by developing the social contract between the government 
and citizens instead of forcing citizens to comply using deterrents. As such, drawing inspiration 
from institutional theory (Helmke and Levistky, 2004; North, 1990), a new way of tackling the 
informal economy has been advanced (Williams and Horodnic I.A., 2015a; Williams et al., 
2015). This views participation in the informal economy to result from an asymmetry between 
civic morale (i.e., informal institutions which prescribe the socially shared unwritten rules) and 
state morale (i.e., formal institutions which define the rule of the game set by laws and 
regulation). The argument is that when these institutions are in symmetry, tax morale will be 
high, and citizens voluntarily comply. Analysing citizens perceptions, this has been confirmed 
regardless of the type of informal work considered. A direct link has been identified between the 
level of tax morale and working without contract (Williams and Horodnic I.A., 2015b, 2016a; 
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Windebank and Horodnic, 2017) as well as salary under-reporting (Williams and Horodnic I.A., 
2015a, 2017b). Indeed, in recent years there has been a heated debate in the literature on which 
formal institutional failures result in low tax morale. A neo-liberal perspective has argued that 
too much government intervention produces low tax morale whilst a structuralist perspective has 
argued that it is due to too little government intervention in the economy and welfare (for a 
review, see Williams, 2014, 2017).
Turning to the few studies conducted on businesses rather than employees, again a link 
has been identified between the level of income and wage underreporting and tolerance to tax 
evasion in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania <GH and Sauka, 2017) as well as in Romania and 
Moldova (<GH et al., 2018). Similarly, analysing businesses in Pakistan, the finding is that the 
level of formalisation is higher with a higher level of tax morality (Williams and Shahid, 2016). 
Furthermore, a study investigating employees working in small businesses across the European 
Union concludes that the likelihood of small businesses participating in the informal economy is 
greater in countries where citizens level of tax morale is lower (Williams and Horodnic I.A., 
2016b). Thus, the following hypothesis can be tested:
The social actor hypothesis (H2): Small businesses will be less affected by the informal 
practices of other businesses when there is an increase in tax morale.
Methodology 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the two policy approaches, we here use data gathered by the 
authors in a representative business survey conducted in 2015 in three South-Eastern European 
countries namely, Croatia, Bulgaria and FYR Macedonia, chosen because they are the countries 
with among the highest levels of informal work in the Europe (Medina and Schneider, 2018). 
The sampling methodology ensured that the samples are proportionate to the universe in each 
country in terms of firm size, region and sector. Out of 1,430 surveyed businesses using face-to-
face interviews conducted by established well-known market research agencies in each country, 
we here kept the 1,384 conducted with small businesses. 
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Given the sensitive nature of the topic, and to build up rapport with the participants, the 
survey adopted a gradual approach to the more sensitive questions. The interview schedule thus 
started by asking the respondents about their satisfaction with the business environment, 
followed by questions on the acceptability of some uncompliant behaviours and only then 
questions regarding the informal economy and whether they consider they are affected by the 
existence of the businesses which employ informal practices. Examining the responses of the 
interviewers regarding the perceived reliability of the interviews, the finding is that in 94 per cent 
of the cases, interviewers reported excellent or fair cooperation from the entrepreneurs. 
Cooperation was bad, or the interviewer did not assess the perceived reliability of the interviews, 
in only 1 per cent of case . Given this, attention can turn to an analysis of the results. 
The hypotheses refer to the effectiveness of two policy approaches, analysing how the 
policy measures are associated with the perceived level of competition from businesses 
employing informal practices. To analyse this, we here use logistic regression analysis. The 
dependent variable measures whether entrepreneurs report being affected by informal 
competitors and is based on the question Is your business affected by the existence of others 
who are doing informal work? (i.e., business that is not going through the books)?. This is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firms declare they are affected by informal 
competitors and a value of 0 otherwise. Thus, an entrepreneur that perceives a policy measure as 
effective will feel less affected by informal competitors because they will perceive the 
prevalence of informal work as lower.  
To evaluate whether there is an association between the extent to which entrepreneurs 
perceive informal competitors as affecting them and the two policy approaches, three key 
explanatory variables are used. On the one hand, the level of institutional asymmetry is measured 
using an interval variable based on participants rating of the acceptability of two types of 
informality, namely: Tax evasion is an economic necessity for companies to survive and 
Underreporting annual revenue or turnover in order to evade taxes is acceptable. The questions 
were measured using a 10-point Likert scale (1 equals completely disagree and 10 completely 
agree). The variable is here recoded, and thus 10 means high tax morale while 1 means the 
opposite. On the other hand, the two variables investigating the two elements of the rational 
economic actor approach are: 
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 Perceived risk of detection numeric variable measuring the perceived risk of detection 
when engaged in informal activities, obtained as a mean of three percentages, based on 
the question For a typical company in your industry, what would you say is the 
approximate probability (0-100%) of being caught, if the company was to: a) underreport 
its business income?; b) underreport its number of employees?; c) underreport the amount 
it pays to employees in salaries?. The original values of the mean, ranging from 0 to 100 
are recoded here with values from 0 to 1.
 Sanction severity: an ordinal variable that measures the perceived severity applied to 
those caught doing informal activities based on the question If a company in your 
industry were caught for deliberately misreporting, what would be the typical 
consequence for the company? and ranges from 1= nothing serious to 5= the company 
would be forced to cease operations.
A series of individual-level and firm-level variables extracted from previous studies analysing 
the likelihood of competing with informal competitors (Ali and Najman, 2018; Hudson et al., 
2012; Williams et al., 2017) and other studies of entrepreneurship in the informal sector (Dau 
and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2014; Khan and Quaddus, 2015; <GH and Sauka, 2017; <GH et al., 
2018) are used as control variables as detailed below.
Individual-level variables/ respondent characteristics
 Owner: a dummy variable with value 1 indicating that the respondent is the company 
owner or manager and 0 otherwise. 
 Gender: a dummy variable with value 1 for female respondents and 0 for male 
respondents. 
 Business management experience: a numeric variable for the number of years of   
business management experience the respondent has.
Firm-level variables/ Business characteristics
 Business size: a categorical variable with value 1 for sole proprietor, value 2 for firms 
with less than 10 employees, and value 3 for firms with 10-49 employees.
 Sector: a categorical variable with value 1 for hotels and restaurants, value 2 for 
agriculture, value 3 for construction, value 4 for retail/ trade/ transport and 
communication, value 5 for public services, value 6 for industry, value 7 for IT/ services 
and value 8 for other sectors.
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 Trading experience: ategorical variable with value 1 for firms with less than one year 
of trading experience, value 2 for firms having between one year and five years of trading 
experience, and value 3 for firms having experience of more than five years in trading. 
 VAT payer: a dummy variable with value 1 for VAT payers and 0 otherwise. 
Furthermore, the models are controlled for country dummies.
For the descriptive analysis we report the crude data for each variable to provide an 
accurate description and to minimise the bias that could be encountered by excluding those 
entrepreneurs who did not provide responses to all the variables in the analysis but provided 
responses for some questions. In the regression analysis, on the other hand, only those 
respondents for which data on every control variable was available for each model were analysed 
due to the technical requirements of this type of analysis. However, as a robustness check, we 
provide the results using multiple imputations for the missing values. The sign and the 
association between the dependent and the independent variables are similar for the crude data 
and the imputed data, underlying the robustness of the results (details in Table A1 in the 
Appendix). Given this caveat, attention turns to the findings.
Findings
Examining the descriptive findings, Table 1 shows that, overall, more than a half of small 
businesses (56 per cent) consider that their business is affected by informal competitors. 
However, there are differences across the three countries. While Bulgarian small businesses are 
less widely affected by informal competitors, with 43 per cent of the respondents reporting that 
this is the case, in FYR Macedonia and Croatia this is higher, with 55 percent and 66 per cent of 
small businesses respectively reporting that they are affected by informal competitors.
Starting to analyse the relationship between the perceived threat posed by informal 
competitors and the various policy approaches, Table 1 reveals the differences between those 
who perceive informal competitors to constrain their small business and those who do not, with 
respect to their perceptions of the risks of detection, the expected sanctions if caught and their 
tax morale.
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Starting with the rational actor approach, Table 1 shows that the perceived risk of 
detection of a business that underreports its income, underreports its number of employees or 
underreports the amount it pays to employees in salaries, is perceived relatively similar by those 
who consider their business to be affected by informal competitors and those who do not (i.e., 46 
per cent compared with 44 per cent). However, the trend differs between the countries. In FYR 
of Macedonia, a lower perceived risk of detection is reported by those not affected by informal 
competitors (i.e., 47 per cent compared with 49 per cent). Turning to the perceived level of 
severity of the sanction applicable for a company caught for deliberately misreporting, the 
overall results are again almost similar between the two groups. Contrary to what the theory 
suggests, the threat of informal competitors is not perceived to be higher when the expected 
sanction is perceived to be lowest. Similarly, and contrary to rational economic actor theory, a 
higher percentage of those reporting to be affected by informal competitors perceive a higher 
level of expected sanction, namely the company is forced to cease operation (6 per cent 
compared with 5 per cent). 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Turning to the social actor model, Table 1 shows that tax morale is higher for those not 
perceiving informal competitors to constrain their small business. In sum, the tentative finding in 
Table 1 is that tax morale is associated with the perceived threat of informal competitors while 
for the deterrents no straightforward link seems to be identified. Thus, small business 
entrepreneurs and managers do not perceive a lower threat from informal competitors when 
sanctions and risks of detection are higher. Whether this is the case when other control variables 
are included in the analyses and controlled for will be analysed with the regression analysis.    
Before doing so, Table 2 provides a more nuanced investigation of which types of 
informality their informal competitors engage in. So far as is known, this has never been 
examined in any previous study. Eight types of informality potentially employed by businesses 
are analysed. Overall, their prevalence is perceived as fairly high, with 17 to 30 per cent of the 
respondents considering that these practices are used always or by most of their competitors. The 
most common informal practices they report used by competitor businesses are the reporting of a 
lower turnover (30 per cent), the reporting of lower profits (29 per cent), hiring employees under 
contracts with hidden clauses (28 per cent), and not issuing receipts/invoices for at least part of 
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their sales (27 per cent). A slightly lower proportion report the practice of hiding or not paying 
taxes, duties and/or excise (25 per cent) and hiring workers without a contract (25 per cent). The 
least prevalent practices are considered as VAT fraud and illicit exporting/importing of goods 
(false documentation/no documentation), 18 per cent and 17 per cent respectively of the 
respondents reporting that these practices occur within their competitor`s businesses always or in 
most cases. However, there are some differences between the countries. While in Croatia and 
Bulgaria the most prevalent informal practice is financial under-reporting (i.e., 33 per cent 
reporting lower turnover in Croatia and 36 per cent reporting lower profits in Bulgaria), in FYR 
Macedonia the most prevalent informal practice is under-reporting the number of employees or 
their wages (i.e., 27 per cent hiring workers without a contract or hiring employees under 
contracts with hidden clauses). 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
These descriptive findings display that there is a low level of horizontal trust in these South-
Eastern European countries. Considering that numerous previous studies (Alm and Gomez, 
2008; Frey and Torgler, 2007; Molero and Pujol, 2012) show that when people perceive that 
others are free riders, their own tax morale is reduced, which can then lead to reduced tax 
compliance, small business entrepreneurs and managers behaviour is very likely to be similar. 
This poses challenges for society and policy makers because, unlike the individual citizens, 
entrepreneurs behaviour can affect more persons besides themselves (i.e., they can hire several 
people with no contracts or on contract with hidden clauses). 
Table 3 reports the results of a logistic regression analysis of the perceived threat of 
informal competitors. Before analysing the findings regarding the policy measures, it is 
important to highlight the type of companies which are more likely to p rceive that they are 
affected by informal sector competition. This reveals no significant differences by respondent 
characteristics (i.e., whether one is the owner or not, gender or experience in business 
management). 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Page 12 of 31Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Sm
all Business and Enterprise D
evelopm
ent
13
When analysing business characteristics, again no significant difference was identified with 
respect to the business trading experience and whether the company is a VAT payer. However, 
those having less than 10 employees perceive a lower likelihood of informal competition 
compared with sole proprietors. Meanwhile, those in the construction sector and retail, trade, 
transport and communication are more likely to perceive that their business is affected by 
informal competitors compared with those in the hospitality industry. This, therefore, provides a 
clear indication of who needs to be targeted in Croatia, Bulgaria and FYR Macedonia in terms of 
sector and company size by policy initiatives. What policy measures, however, should be used?  
To answer this, we turn to the policy measures and start with whether the perceived threat 
of other companies employing informal practices is associated with the level of deterrents when 
individual level/ respondent characteristics variables and firm level/ business characteristics are 
introduced and held constant. No statistically significant association is identified. Those 
perceiving a higher sanction to be in place for companies caught operating informally as well as 
those who perceive the risk of being detected to be higher, are not more likely to consider that 
informal competitors affect their small business (refuting H1a and H1b).  
On the other hand, analysing the social actor approach, the finding is that the higher the 
level of tax morale, the lower is the likelihood that the business will consider it is affected by the 
existence of informal competitors (confirming H2). 
To further explore the effects of the competing policy approaches used by governments 
to tackle informal work, Figures 1 and 2 outline the predicted probabilities for a representative 
small business in South-Eastern Europe to perceive informal competitors as constraining them, 
according to the level of tax morale and the perceived sanctions and risk of detection. This 
representative small business is obtained using the mean and the modal values of the remaining 
explanatory variables in the regression analysis. As such, the representative small business is a 
VAT registered business in Croatia, with less than 10 employees, more than 5 years trading 
experience, in retail/trade/transport and communication sector run by a male owner with 13 years 
of management experience. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
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Figure 1 reveals that the probability that this representative small business would consider it is 
affected by informal competitors ranges from slightly below 65 per cent to about 78 per cent 
depending on the tax morale and the perceived risk of detection of the small business respondent. 
However, while the difference is about 10 per cent according to the level of tax morale, with a 
smaller probability when tax morale improves, the effect of risk of detection is rather 
imperceptible. Similarly, Figure 2 shows that probability of a representative small business 
considering that informal competitors affect their business is more influenced by the 
respondents tax morale than by the perceived level of sanction applicable to those caught for 
deliberately misreporting. However, for the same level of tax morale, the probability of 
perceiving informal competitors to affect them decreases with an increase in the perceived level 
of penalty.  
  
Discussion and Conclusions
This paper has investigated whether there is an association between the perceived threat of 
informal competition witnessed by small businesses and two distinct policy approaches for 
reducing informal work. Analysing a representative sample of small businesses in three 
countries, namely Bulgaria, Croatia and FYR Macedonia, the finding is that there is no 
association between the perceived threat of informal competitors by small businesses and the 
perceived level of risk of detection or of the severity of sanction for such practices. Put another 
way, entrepreneurs do not consider that the threat of informality is reduced by applying tougher 
deterrents. They do not consider that competitors will reduce the informal practices they employ 
(e.g., underreporting profit or turnover, using undeclared workers) with increased penalties. 
However, a strong association is identified between the level of tax morale and the perceived 
threat of informal practices employed by competitors. The intimation is that increasing the level 
of deterrents will have little impact on informality, while measures seeking to improve tax 
morale and thus the social contract between the government and citizens may result in less 
informality. This implies that changes are required in both formal institutions, by improving 
procedural justice, procedural fairness and redistributive justice (Horodnic, 2018; Horodnic and 
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Williams, 2018; Molero and Pujol, 2012; Murphy, 2005; Williams and Horodnic I.A., 2015a; 
Williams and Horodnic A.V., 2017, 2018) as well as changes in informal institutions by reducing 
the acceptability among entrepreneurs of non-compliant behaviour (e.g., underreporting 
profits/turnover, underreporting the number of employees or their wages).      
The study reveals, however, that not only measures aimed at improving the social 
contract between the government and citizens (i.e., vertical trust) are necessary, but also 
measures to improve horizontal trust in the business community. No less than 56 per cent of the 
entrepreneurs perceive informal competitors to be a threat to their business. Furthermore, some 
one in three small businesses consider that practices such as reporting a lower turnover/ lower 
profits, hiring employees under a contract with hidden clauses or not issuing receipts/ invoices 
for at least part of their sales, occur always or in most competitor businesses. This is particularly 
important considering that previous studies with citizens showed that tax morale is reduced when 
they consider that other taxpayers are free riders (Alm and Gomez, 2008; Frey and Torgler, 
2007; Molero and Pujol, 2012). In the case of entrepreneurs, the lack of trust in the wider 
business community and their competitors might lead as well to a reduced level of compliance, 
especially considering that their competitors using informal practices gain competitive 
advantages by doing so. To improve horizontal trust between entrepreneurs, information on their 
peers might be provided. For example, a study on citizens showed that letters providing 
information on other citizens behaviour had a positive effect on timely payments of those who 
did not pay their tax due on time. From all the messages used, the most specific one, namely 
nine out of ten in the UK pay their tax on time. You are currently in the very small minority of 
people who have not paid us yet, has the highest effect (Hallsworth et al., 2017). A similar 
campaign could be designed for the business community and specifically targeted at those 
business sectors identified above where the perception that informal competitors exist is most 
prevalent.
Nevertheless, this paper has limitations. Although it displays the significant effect of tax 
morale and displays the low level of horizontal trust in small businesses in these countries, it is 
not able to reveal the reasons for the low level of tax morale (i.e., vertical trust) and horizontal 
trust. The importance of trust in the economic and social environment has been widely 
documented in the literature (Kayaoglu, 2017; Sztompka; 2003). According to Sztompka (2003, 
p. 50), the diffusion of trust or distrust from one level to another happens quite commonly, 
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because trust as well as distrust are contagious. In many cases trust seems to spread out from 
above to toward lower levels, and distrust, from the bottom upwards. Accordingly, when an 
entrepreneur loses trust because of observing a case of corruption for example, they start to think 
in a stereotyped way and to consider that there is corruption in all cases and therefore, this leads 
to institutional distrust. Further quantitative and in-depth qualitative research is therefore 
necessary to identify the formal institutional deficiencies which lead to low levels of trust. For 
example, investigating 18 countries in Asia-Pacific region, Autio and Fu (2015) concluded that 
the quality of institutions has a substantial influence on informal entrepreneurship and an 
increase of the quality of economic and political institutions with one standard deviation can 
double the prevalence of the formal entrepreneurship on one hand and, reduce by a half the 
prevalence of the informal entrepreneurship on the other hand. Thus, identifying the precise 
formal institutions failures would enable tailored policy measures for enhancing the level of trust 
between entrepreneurs as well a  between entrepreneurs and government. Future studies, 
moreover, might experiment with asking entrepreneurs directly about their engagement in the 
informal economy, rather than whether their direct competitors engage in informal economic 
practices. At present, it is an a priori assumption that such direct questions are not feasible, with 
no evidence-base that this is the case. Experimentation with more direct questions on 
participation in informal economic practices would therefore be useful in future surveys to 
evaluate its feasibility.   
In sum, this paper underlines the importance of the social actor approach in tackling 
informal entrepreneurship and displays the need for a shift away from the deterrence measures of 
the rational actor approach and towards policy measures which seek to improve tax morale and 
the level of horizontal trust between entrepreneurs. 
Acknowledgement
This paper is part of a project that has received funding from the European Unions Horizon 
2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie (
O
'* grant agreement 
no. 746358. The data gathering was funded by the European Commissions Framework 7 
Industry-Academia Partnerships Programme (IAPP) grant no. 611259 entitled Out of the 
shadows: developing capacities and capabilities for tackling undeclared work in Bulgaria, 
Page 16 of 31Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Sm
all Business and Enterprise D
evelopm
ent
17
Croatia and FYR Macedonia (GREY). The authors would like to thank the funders for 
providing the financial support to enable this to be written. The usual disclaimers apply. 
References 
Acs, Z., Desai, S., Stenholm, P. and Wuebker, R. (2013), Institutions and the rate of formal and 
informal entrepreneurship across countries, Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research, 
Vol. 35 No. 15, pp. 1-24.
Ali, N. and Najman, B. (2018), Informal competition, firm productivity and policy reforms in 
Egypt, in Horodnic, I.A., Rodgers, P., Williams, C.C. and Momtazian, L. (Eds.), The 
Informal Economy Exploring Drivers and Practices, Routledge, New York and London, 
pp. 229-254. 
Allingham, M. and Sandmo, A. (1972), Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis, Journal of 
Public Economics, Vol. 1 No. 2, pp. 323-338.
Alm, J. and Gomez, J.L. (2008), Social capital and tax morale in Spain, Economic Analysis 
and Policy, Vol. 38 No. 1, pp. 73-87.
Autio, E. and Fu, K. (2015), Economic and political institutions and entry into formal and 
informal entrepreneurship, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Vol. 32 No. 1, 67-94.
Chang, T.-J. and Lai, C.-C. (2004), Collaborative tax evasion and social norms: why deterrence 
does not work, Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 56 No. 2, pp. 344-368.
Chepurenko, A. (2016), Informal entrepreneurship and informal entrepreneurial activity in 
Russia, in Sauka, A., Schneider, F. and Williams, C.C. (Eds.), Entrepreneurship and the 
Shadow Economy, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp. 119-150.
Dau, L.A. and Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2014), To formalize or not to formalize: entrepreneurship 
and pro-market institutions, Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 29 No 5, pp. 668-686.
European Commission (2016), Working Conditions - Undeclared work, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=706&intPageId=2983&langId=en (accessed 3 
June 2018).
Page 17 of 31 Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Sm
all Business and Enterprise D
evelopm
ent
18
Feld, L.P. and Frey, B.S. (2002), Trust breeds trust: how taxpayers are treated, Economics of 
Governance, Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 87-99.
Frey, B.S. and Torgler, B. (2007), Tax morale and conditional cooperation, Journal of 
Comparative Economics, Vol. 35 No. 1, pp. 136-159.
Hallsworth, M., List, J.A., Metcalfe, R.D. and Vlaev, I. (2017), The behavioralist as tax 
collector: using natural field experiments to enhance tax compliance, Journal of Public 
Economics, Vol. 148, pp. 14-31.
Hartl, B., Hofmann, E., Gangl, K., Hartner-Tiefenthaler, M. and Kirchler, E. (2015), Does the 
sole description of a tax authority affect tax evasion? - The impact of described coercive 
and legitimate power, PLoS One, Vol. 10 No. 4, e0123355.
Helmke, G., and Levitsky, S. (2004), Informal institutions and comparative politics: a research 
agenda, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 2 No. 4, pp. 725-740.
Hofmann, E., Hartl, B., Gangl, K., Hartner-Tiefenthaler, M. and Kirchler, E. (2017), 
Authorities coercive and legitimate power: the impact on cognitions underlying 
cooperation, Frontiers in Psychology, Vol. 8 No. 5, doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00005.
Horodnic, I.A. (2018), Tax morale and institutional theory: a systematic review, International 
Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, Vol. 38 No. 9/10, pp. 868-886. 
Horodnic, I.A. and Williams, C.C, (2018), Do deterrents prevent undeclared work? An 
evaluation of the rational economic actor approach, Policy Brief no.1, Sheffield 
University Management School, available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3108375 
(accessed 10 May 2018).
Hudson, J., Williams, C.C., Orviska, M. and Nadin, S. (2012), Evaluating the impact of the 
informal economy on businesses in South East Europe: some lessons from the 2009 
World Bank Enterprise Survey, The South-East European Journal of Economics and 
Business, Vol. 7 No. 1, pp. 99-110.
ILO (2015), The transition from the informal to the formal economy. Report V (2A), ILO 
Conference, 104th Sess., ILO, Geneva.
Kaplanoglou, G., and Rapanos, V.T. (2015), Why do people evade taxes? New experimental 
evidence from Greece, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Vol. 56, pp. 
21-32.
Page 18 of 31Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Sm
all Business and Enterprise D
evelopm
ent
19
Kaplanoglou, G., Rapanos, V.T. and Daskalakis, N. (2016), Tax compliance behaviour during 
the crisis: the case of Greek SMEs, European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 42 
No. 3, pp. 405-444.
Karlinger, L. (2013), The dark side of deregulation: how competition affects the size of the 
shadow economy, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 16 No. 2, pp. 283-321.
Kayaoglu, A. (2017), Determinants of trust in Turkey, European Societies, Vol. 19 No. 4, pp. 
492-516.
Khan, E.A. and Quaddus, M. (2015), Examining the influence of business environment on 
socioeconomic performance of informal microenterprises: content analysis and partial 
least square approach, International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, Vol. 35 No. 
3/4, pp. 273-288.
La Porta, R. and Shleifer, A. (2014), Informality and development, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 28 No. 3, pp. 109-126.
London, T., Esper, H., Grogan-Kaylor, E. and Kistruck, G.M. (2014), Connecting poverty to 
purchase in informal markets, Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, Vol. 8 No. 1, pp. 37-
55.
Masud, A., Manaf, N.A.A. and Saad, N. (2015), Testing assumptions of the slippery slope 
framework using cross-country data: evidence from sub-Saharan Africa, International 
Journal of Business and Society, Vol. 16 No. 3, pp. 408-421.
Mazzolini, G., Pagani, L. and Santoro, A. (2017), The deterrence effect of real-world 
operational tax audits, DEMS Working Paper Series No. 359, Department of 
Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milan  Bicocca.
Medina, L. and Schneider, F. (2018), Shadow economies around the world: what did we learn 
over the last 20 years?, International Monetary Fund Working Papers, African 
Department.
Molero, J.C. and Pujol, F. (2012), Walking inside the potential tax evaders mind: tax morale 
does matter, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 105 No. 2, pp. 151-162.
Murphy, K. (2005), Regulating more effectively: the relationship between procedural justice, 
legitimacy, and tax non-compliance, Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 32 No. 4, pp. 
562-589.
Page 19 of 31 Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Sm
all Business and Enterprise D
evelopm
ent
20
Murphy, K. (2008), Enforcing tax compliance: to punish or persuade?, Economic Analysis & 
Policy, Vol. 38 No. 1, pp. 113-135.
Murphy, K., and Harris, N. (2007), Shaming, shame and recidivism: a test of reintegrative 
shaming theory in the white-collar crime context, The British Journal of Criminology, 
Vol. 47 No. 6, pp. 900-917.
North, D.C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge.
OECD (2008), OECD Employment Outlook, OECD, Paris.
OECD (2012), Reducing Opportunities for Tax Non-Compliance in the Underground Economy, 
OECD, Paris.
<GH T. and Sauka, A. (2017), Shadow Economy Index for the Baltic countries 2009  
2016, The Centre for Sustainable Business at Stockholm School of Economics in Riga.
<GH T., Sauka, A. and Davidescu, A.A. (2018), Shadow Economy Index for Moldova and 
Romania 2015  2016, The Centre for Sustainable Business at Stockholm School of 
Economics in Riga.
Sauka, A., Schneider, F. and Williams, C.C. (Eds.) (2016), Entrepreneurship and the shadow 
economy: A European perspective, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Shaw, J., Slemrod, J. and Whiting, J. (2008), Administration & Compliance, The Institute for 
Fiscal Studies, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Sztompka, P. (2003), Trust: A Sociological Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Williams, C.C. (2014), Confronting the Shadow Economy: evaluating tax compliance and 
behaviour policies, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
Williams, C.C. (2017), Tackling employment in the informal economy: a critical evaluation of 
the neo-liberal policy approach, Economic and Industrial Democracy: an International 
Journal, Vol. 38 No.1, pp. 145-169.  
Williams, C.C. (2018), Entrepreneurship in the Informal Sector: An Institutional Perspective, 
Routledge, London.
Williams, C.C. and Franic, J. (2015), Tackling the propensity towards undeclared work: some 
policy lessons from Croatia, South East European Journal of Economics and Business, 
Vol. 10 No. 1, pp. 18-31.
Page 20 of 31Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Sm
all Business and Enterprise D
evelopm
ent
21
Williams, C.C and Franic, J. (2016), Beyond a deterrence approach towards the undeclared 
economy: some lessons from Bulgaria, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 
Vol. 18 No. 1, pp. 90-106.  
Williams, C.C. and Horodnic, A.V. (2017), Rethinking informal payments by patients in 
Europe: an institutional approach, Health Policy, Vol. 121 No. 10, pp. 1053-1062.
Williams, C.C. and Horodnic, A.V. (2018), Explaining informal payments for health services in 
Central and Eastern Europe: an institutional asymmetry perspective, Post-Communist 
Economies, Vol. 30 No. 4, pp. 440-458.
Williams, C.C. and Horodnic, I.A. (2015a), Evaluating the prevalence of the undeclared 
economy in Central and Eastern Europe: an institutional asymmetry perspective, 
European Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 21 No. 4, pp. 389-406.
Williams, C.C. and Horodnic, I.A. (2015b), Explaining and tackling the shadow economy in 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania: a tax morale approach, Baltic Journal of Economics, Vol. 
15 No 2, pp. 81-98.
Williams, C.C. and Horodnic, I.A. (2016a), An institutional theory of the informal economy: 
some lessons from the United Kingdom, International Journal of Social Economics, 
Vol. 43 No. 7, pp. 722-738.
Williams, C.C. and Horodnic, I.A. (2016b), Cross-country variations in the participation of 
small businesses in the informal economy: a  institutional asymmetry explanation, 
Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development, Vol. 23 No. 1, pp. 3-24.
Williams, C.C. and Horodnic, I.A. (2017a), Regulating the sharing economy to prevent the 
growth of the informal sector in the hospitality industry, International Journal of 
Contemporary Hospitality Management, Vol. 29 No. 9, pp. 2261-2278.
Williams, C.C. and Horodnic, I.A. (2017b), Evaluating the illegal employer practice of under-
reporting employees salaries, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 55 No. 1, pp. 
83-111.
Williams, C.C. and Kedir, A. (2018), Explaining cross-national variations in the prevalence of 
informal sector entrepreneurship: lessons from a survey of 142 countries, Journal of 
Developmental Entrepreneurship, Vol. 23 No. 1, 1850005. 
Page 21 of 31 Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Sm
all Business and Enterprise D
evelopm
ent
22
Williams, C.C. and Puts, E. (2017), Platform Survey Report: organisational characteristics of 
enforcement bodies, measures adopted to tackle undeclared work, and the use of 
databases and digital tools, European Commission, Brussels.
Williams, C.C. and Shahid, M.S. (2016), Informal entrepreneurship and institutional theory: 
explaining the varying degrees of (in)formalization of entrepreneurs in Pakistan, 
Entrepreneurship & Regional Development, Vol. 28 No. 1-2, pp. 1-25.
Williams, C.C., Horodnic, I.A. and Windebank, J. (2015), Explaining participation in the 
informal economy: an institutional incongruence perspective, International Sociology, 
Vol. 30 No. 3, pp. 294-313.
Williams, C.C., Martinez-Perez, A. and Kedir, A.M. (2017), Informal entrepreneurship in 
developing economies: the impacts of starting-up unregistered on firm performance, 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 41 No. 5, pp. 773-799.
Williams, C.C., Shahid, M. and Martinez-Perez, A. (2016), Determinants of the level of 
informality of informal micro-enterprises: some evidence from the city of Lahore 
Pakistan, World Development, Vol. 84, pp. 312-325.
Windebank, J. and Horodnic, I.A. (2017), Explaining participation in undeclared work in 
France: lessons for policy evaluation, International Journal of Sociology and Social 
Policy, Vol. 37 No. 3-4, pp. 203-217.
Page 22 of 31Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Sm
all Business and Enterprise D
evelopm
ent
23
Table 1. Perceived threat of informal sector competition: by tax morale, expected sanctions and 
perceived risk of detection
Total HR BG FYROM
Business affected by informal competitors (%) 56 66 43 55
Tax morale (mean) 7.0 7.4 6.2 6.9
Perceived risk of detection (mean) 0.44 0.42 0.39 0.49
Sanction severity (%)
Nothing serious/ Small fine 26 19 43 24
Serious fine 68 75 55 68
Forced to cease operations 6 6 2 8
Business not affected by informal competitors (%) 44 34 57 45
Tax morale (mean) 7.3 8.1 6.7 7.2
Perceived risk of detection (mean) 0.46 0.43 0.47 0.47
Sanction severity (%)
Nothing serious/ Small fine 27 20 29 31
Serious fine 68 70 68 65
Forced to cease operations 5 10 3 4
Note: Dont know/ refusal excluded.
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Table 2. Informal practices occurring within direct competitor businesses
Type of informal work Sample Always
In most 
cases
Sometimes Never
Total 4 20 54 22
HR 4 20 61 15
BG 3 18 58 21
Hiring a worker without a contract
FYROM 4 23 41 32
Total 4 24 50 22
HR 6 22 57 15
BG 2 28 55 15
Hiring an employee under contract with hidden clauses 
(social insurance and contributions paid based on a 
minimum wage, whilst the rest of the pay is paid 
undeclared, without a payslip) FYROM 4 23 39 34
Total 5 25 48 22
HR 8 25 50 17
BG 2 31 50 17
Reporting lower turnover
FYROM 3 20 44 33
Total 4 21 49 26
HR 7 19 51 23
BG 2 27 54 17
Hiding/ not paying taxes, duties and/or excises
FYROM 4 17 41 38
Total 4 23 49 24
HR 7 21 54 18
BG 2 31 50 17
Not issuing receipts/ invoices for at least part of their 
sales
FYROM 2 18 42 38
Total 5 24 51 20
HR 9 22 53 16
BG 2 34 49 15
Reporting lower profits
FYROM 4 16 50 31
Total 4 13 40 43
HR 5 12 40 43
BG 4 15 42 39
Illicit exporting/importing of goods (false 
documentation/ no documentation)
FYROM 2 13 38 47
Total 5 13 44 38
HR 7 16 49 28
BG 3 10 48 39
VAT fraud
FYROM 3 10 36 51
Note: Dont know/ refusal excluded.
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Table 3. Logit regression of the likelihood of small businesses perceiving their business to be 
affected by informal competitors
Model 1 Model 2
Variables  se() Exp()  se() Exp()
Tax morale -0.084 *** 0.027 0.920 -0.072 ** 0.028 0.931
Perceived risk of detection -0.018 0.212 0.982 0.018 0.220 1.018
Sanction severity -0.099 0.073 0.906 -0.089 0.076 0.915
Respondent characteristics
Owner (Ref: No)
Yes 0.154 0.148 1.166 0.229 0.158 1.258
Gender (Ref: Male)
Female 0.123 0.130 1.131 0.206 0.136 1.229
Business management experience 0.005 0.007 1.005 -0.001 0.008 0.999
Business characteristics
Business size (Ref: sole proprietor)
Less than 10 employees -0.652 ** 0.326 0.521
10-49 employees -0.606 0.389 0.546
Sector (Ref: Hotels and restaurants)
Agriculture 0.344 0.447 1.411
Construction 0.903 *** 0.347 2.468
Retail/Trade/Transport and Communication 0.675 ** 0.274 1.965
Public services -0.333 0.381 0.717
Industry 0.661 * 0.349 1.937
IT/Services 0.244 0.314 1.276
Other 0.314 0.307 1.368
Trading experience (Ref: under 1 year)
1-5 years 0.174 0.398 1.190
More than 5 years 0.186 0.390 1.204
VAT payer (Ref: No)
Yes 0.087 0.171 1.091
Country (Ref: Croatia)
Bulgaria -1.082 *** 0.168 0.339 -1.097 *** 0.181 0.334
FYR Macedonia -0.360 ** 0.155 0.698 -0.334 * 0.171 0.716
Constant 1.363 *** 0.352 3.908 1.129 * 0.644 3.094
Observations 1,072 1,043
Pseudo R2 0.0340 0.0510
Log likelihood -710.6062 -677.5350
W2 50.05 72.79
p> 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All coefficients are compared to the benchmark category, 
shown in brackets.
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Figure 1. Predicted probability of a representative small businesses perceiving their business to 
be affected by informal competitors: by tax morale and perceived risk of detection
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Figure 2. Predicted probability of a representative small businesses perceiving their business to 
be affected by informal competitors: by tax morale and sanction severity
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Appendix
Table A1. Logit regression of the likelihood of small businesses perceiving their business to be 
affected by informal competitors, imputed data
Model 1 Model 2
Variables  se() Exp()  se() Exp()
Tax morale -0.083 *** 0.025 0.920 -0.082 *** 0.026 0.922
Perceived risk of detection -0.011 0.195 0.989 0.001 0.198 1.000
Sanction severity -0.101 0.064 0.904 -0.112 * 0.065 0.894
Respondent characteristics
Owner (Ref: No)
Yes 0.166 0.134 1.181 0.208 0.140 1.232
Gender (Ref: Male)
Female 0.159 0.118 1.172 0.222 * 0.122 1.248
Business management experience 0.004 0.007 1.004 0.001 0.007 1.000
Business characteristics
Business size (Ref: sole proprietor)
Less than 10 employees -0.343 0.285 0.709
10-49 employees -0.325 0.342 0.722
Sector (Ref: Hotels and restaurants)
Agriculture 0.162 0.396 1.176
Construction 0.676 ** 0.305 1.966
Retail/Trade/Transport and 
Communication
0.573 ** 0.247 1.773
Public services -0.211 0.332 0.810
Industry 0.578 * 0.316 1.782
IT/Services 0.129 0.277 1.138
Other 0.177 0.275 1.193
Trading experience (Ref: under 1 year)
1-5 years 0.090 0.370 1.094
More than 5 years 0.171 0.367 1.187
VAT payer (Ref: No)
Yes 0.054 0.153 1.056
Country (Ref: Croatia)
Bulgaria -1.013 *** 0.150 0.363 -1.054 *** 0.159 0.348
FYR Macedonia -0.476 *** 0.141 0.621 -0.513 *** 0.155 0.599
Constant 1.372 *** 0.313 3.942 1.173 ** 0.584 3.232
Observations 1,384 1,384
Imputations 50 50
F 6.37 3.59
p> 0.0000 0.0000
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Notes: Significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All coefficients are compared to the benchmark category, 
shown in brackets.
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